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A FIXED POINT APPROACH TO MULTIAGENT
ADAPTIVE CONTROL
ByD. L. BRrro ANt) M. D. INTRIIIGATOR
This article classifies and analyzes various approaches to the multiagent problem. Static, dv-
namjc, and adaptive situations are considered, as ii the posibility of a third party to facilitate
the sending and receiving of signals. The objectives of the two agents nighr be in oppositioni/ic
same, other (but known), or other (but unknown). Three of the possible combinations of .citua-
lions and objectives generally not disc'jssed in the literature are given special attention here.
I. INTRODUCTION
The multiagent problem, in which an Outcome is determined by the joint
actionsoftwo or more agents, is one that arises in a variety of contexts,
including many economic and political situations. Because the problem is
a complex one and because it has been studied by analysts in different dis-
ciplines using different approaches, many solution concepts have been
proposed, some of which represent the same concept under different
names. The purpose of this paper is to classify and analyze these various
approaches. Only the two agent problem is treated in full recognition of
the fact that, while this problem exhibits salient aspects of themore gen-
eral multiagent problem it does not exhibit all aspects, e.g. coalition for-
mation. The difficulty in going from the two agent case to the threeor
more agent case should not be underestimated.
2. A CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIAGENT SITUATIONS
A classification of various types of multiagent situations is presented
in Table 1. The rows represent alternative treatments of time and infornia-
tion available to the agents. Thus the problem might be static, defined at
a point in time, or dynamic, evolving over time. The adaptive case is one
in which the problem evolves over time, but in which the agents learn
from the past historyofthe system, with each communicating to and re-
ceiving signals from the other agents via the actions taken. Finally there is
the third party case in which such a party, who is formally not oneofthe
agents, facilitates the sending and receiving of signals via direct com-
munication.
The columns of the table represent alternative assumptions concern-
ing each agent's awarenessofthe objective(s) of the other agents. The













































































































































































































































































































Copposed, the constant (or zero) sum case. The same case is that in which
the objectives of the agents are identical, the constant difference case. The
other but knowncase is where there may be elements of conflict, asin the
"opposite" case, and elements of cooperation, as in the "same" case, but
the objectives of every agent is known to all agents. Theother hut unknown
case is that in which the objectives of other agents areunknown.
While not every case in Table I has been the subject of analysis, se-
eral have.' Thus classical game theory, e.g. two-person zero-sum gaines,
would represent an example of the static/opposite case, classical team
theory is an example of the static/same case, while classical duopoly
theory exemplifies the static/other but knowncase.2The Nash equilibrium
represents a solution concept for the static/other but unknown case.The
dynamic case is illustrated itt the opposite objectives case by differential
games, while the adaptive case is illustrated in the sameobjectives case by
learning by doing. The Nash bargaining game solution illustrates the third
party/other but known case since it gives a third party referee or mediator
a rule for allocating between the agents.3
The cases labelled A, B, and C in Table I are those of particularin-
terest here. In these eases, particularly in B and C, wherethe objectives of
the other agents are unknown, the agents typically formulate certain
paradigms as a way of structuring information explaining the behavior
and objectives of the other agents4, then formulate theories as to thebe-
havior of the other agents in the context of the paradigm. In thedynamic
case the paradigm itself evolves over time,while in the adaptive case it
evolves in response to actual behavior of the other agents and in the third-
party case it is influenced by the third-party intervention.
3. EXAMPLES OF MULTIAGENT SITUATIONS
Many examples can be given from both economics and international
relations of the cases of interest hereA, B, and C. In economics the
problem of duopoly is, in reality, one in which agents are unaware of ob-
jectives of other agents, one in which they formulate paradigms as to be-
havior and objectives of the other firms (e.g. the leader-follower para-
digm) and one in which they learn from both past behavior andthird
parties. Another example frojn economics is monetary and fiscal policy,
involving conflict over the proper course for stabilization and control of
the economy. Each agent has its own paradigmmonetarist orKeynes-
ianto explain the economy and theproper role for policy, with the
tSce Intriligator (1911) for a treatment of scvcral of these cases.
20n team theory see Marshak and Radner (1972).
3See Brito. Buoncristiani. and Intriligator (1977).
4Kuhn (1970) discusses such paradigms in science, which may be considered a multi-
agent situation in which one agent is "nature."
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Yetathird example from economics is labormanagement negotiatjo5
where, again, each side develops a paradigm. In !hs example a third
party, such as an arbitrator or mediator, can play a signiIicanrole in
modifying the paradigms used by both sides.
Other examplesofmultiagent situations ariseiiithe area of intern
tional relations. One is an armament race, where each side formulates
certain paradigms as to the objectives and behavior of the other, e.g.asto
the question of superiority vs. sufficiencyinkve Is of armaments5Another
example is overall postwar East-West relations, where each sidehas
developed its own paradigm, e.g. the "lessons of Munich" leadingthe
West to a policy of containment and the German invasion of Russialead-
ing the East to large standing armies and the objective ofabufferzone in
Europe. A third example is regional conflicts, such as the MiddleEast,
where third parties have played highly influential roles via"shuttle diplo-
macy." international conferences. etc.
4. A FORMAL MODE!. OF THE Two AGENTSITUATION
In the formal model of the two agent situation,the agents, indexed
by i=1, 2, each seek to maximize the objective functional
() JJ [x(t), u(i))di + GJx( T)],I =1,2,
by choice ofu1(:) over theperiod from r toT,where rcan assumeall
values between 0 and T. Theyare therefore continually revising theirplans
at each instant r in [0, Tj, maximizing .1,.relative to the initial pointr. The resulting plan for eachagent is called a "rolling plan" becauseof its con-
tinual revision in the lightof new information. Ratherthan commit them-
selves in advance toa specific course of action theagents can revise their plans at each instant oftime r.It will be assumed herethatW,(.)and G1(.) are twice differentiableconcave functions.
The system as describedby the vector ofstate variables xX evolves over time accordingto the differential equationsystem
(2) x = f[x(z),u1(I), u2(t)J,rI T,
defined over the finiteinterval [0, T]. Heref(.)is a concave and twice dif-
ferentiable function andu1(t), under control ofagent I,is an element of a compact subset ofEudlidean r1 space.
The historicalevolution ofu1(t)in the interval [0,rI is given by the
5See !ntrjIjatcjrand Brito (1976a 19761,)
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atrajectory
where V.(T) is the space of all continuous functions u(t) defIned over
10, TI, and where, at any time, u(t) e W. The planned evolution of
u,(i) in the interval T, TI is gien by the trajectory
a
where(J1(r)is the space of all continuous functions u(t) defined over
[r,T], and where, at any time1,u1(1)ë .The objective of agent
iis then to select u E U(r), using information contained inV(r) x
V2(T), so as to maximize j1 in (1) subject to the differential equation system
in(2).
5. TuDYNAMIC SITUATION INWuicuTUE OTHER AGENT'S
STRATEGY IS KNOWN (CASE A).
Consider now CaseAin Table I the dynamic situation in which the
other agent's strategy is known.
PROPOSITION 1.If theagent knows the strategy of the1th
agent on the interval (r, T] then there exists a continuous function F1 such
that the i° agent's optimal strategy is given by
the mappingcan he interpreted as a reaction curve in function space.
ProofThe existence of the F, mappings follows from the gen-
eralized Weierstrass theorem, assuming W(.) and f() ar'sufliciently
smooth so that J, is a continuous functional of the control trajectory u
To show that F, is continuous use the maximum principle and consider
the arbitrary variation of thejut agents strategy on [r, T] a7 defined by
u1(1)= u7(i) +





Clearly for all tin[T,TIu7(t) is acontinuous function of 1, implying
that F1 is a continuous function ofu1.
Given the F mappings there exist fixed point strategies via
6For the generalized Weierstrass theorem see intriligator (1971).
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PROPOSITION 2.There exist fixed point strategies u7,,such
F1(u7)
and thepairof fixed point slrategies(u7, u7) constitute a Nashequilihrj
j(,1*11*)J,(u1,u7).
ProofThe set U,(i) is compact since u,(t)is uniformlybounded and(J1(r)is a closed subset of the set of all paths definedover[r,TJ, which
is a complete space. Thus the mapping
(10) (u7,u1*)(F1(u7),F1(u)),
which exists since the mapping is a continuousone from a compactset into itself, represents a mapping froma compact set into itself.Such a mapping always has a fixed point. The fixedpoint is a Nashequilibrj by construction of the F.
This fixed point pair of strategies obtainedhere requires thateach agent know the other agent's strategy (orobjective function),a requireme
which comprises more structure thanis generally available.Without this information there is no guaranteethat the Nash equilibriumwill be at- tainedeven asymptotically. Itthus becomes importantto modify the problem by not assuming knowledgeof the other's strategy,leading to Case B in Table I.
6.THEADAPTIVE SITUATION IN WHIGHTHE OTHER AGENT'S
STRATEGYIs NOT KNOWN (CASE B).
En Case B in TableI the agents donot know the strategy (orobjec- tive) of the otheragent, but they obtainsome information concerningthe other agent from theirknowledge of paststrategies up to timer,given by s and v1. Specifically, itwill be assumed thatagent I uses the information Contained in V(r)x V1(r) to predict theresponse of agentjto its own action.7Thus it is assumedthat there existcontinuous functions P
(11) P1: V1(r) x(r)x L(r)U,(r)
mapping paststrategies of bothagents and the feasibleset of current strategies (at timer)into a predictioiby agent I of thestrategy to be em- ployed by agent].This predictionuses all informationavailable on past actions up to timeT.The 1° agent'schoice of strategyu,on the interval
1This type ofinformation is not takeninto account in theclassical models of duopolistic interaction that treata dynamic process Using
a myopic framework in whichinformation as to past behavior playsno role.
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that(r, TJ is then given by the composite mapping
F,. P: V(r) x V1(r) x (14(1)U(T).
In this adaptive case the compostc mappings yield fixedpoints
strategies via
I'ROI'OSI [ION 3.For all s',in(r) x V,(r) there exist strate-
giesu7*, u7tsuch that
= P.(v, v1,u7),u,'4= P1(t',,v1,**)
Proof,For fixed v,,i, the composite mapping II' can be consid-
ered a mapping of U4, which is compact, as noted above, intoitself.
is continuous, however, so there exists a fixed point u7'.
It should he noted that the Nash equilibrium (or "rational expecta-
tions" solution) will be reached only ii each of the agents correctly pre-
dicts the strategy of the other
u7* =
This prediction is unlikely, however, so the dynamics of the processin-
volves a study of the evolution of the rolling plan.5
The mapping given by (12) suggests that in theadaptive case the be-
havior of the two agents is coupled only by the informatk;ncontained in
V4(r) xV,(r). Thus, the obvious question occurs about the existenceof
"self-fulfilling equilibria", that is, equilibria in which the behaviorof
agents is such that their expectations are fulfilled. Anexample of such an
equilibrium would be if every agent expected inflation and thustried to
avoid monetary assets. The consequences of such behavior maybe such
that there would indeed be inflation. In the nextproposition it will be
demonstrated that alt self-fulfilling equilibria must be Nashequilibria and
thus their existence is independent of how agents processinformation.
This is not to suggest that research into the nature of such processesis not
interesting, hut it should be noted that such research addressesphenom-
ena that inherently concerndisequilibria. Although the proposition ad-
dresses the case of two agents it can he applied to marketswith two
classes of identical agents.
PROPOSITION 4.All equilibria that are self-fulfilling are Nash
equilibria.
ProofDefineas the projection of an element in V4(i) xfr(r) x
(J.(r) to U,(r)
4: V,(T) xV1(i) x U4(r) U4(r).
tScc Brito (1972) for an exarnpk of such a proccss for the case of thedynamics of an
arms race. There it was shown that the stability ofthe process dcpcnds on the agents' reac-
tions to information about derivatives.
143Figure IInteractions between the agents
Figure I depicts the interactions between the two agents.
Suppose that the information available to the two agents at time T is
(T) and(t) and thati71(r)andU(r)are the equilibriumstrategies
chosen. Then if the equilibrium is self-fulfilling,
(I 6) i(r) = PFV,(i),(T), ü,(T)j
arid
= F{r1[i(T),i(r), kr)j.
Equating these implies that
P.[i(r),(i),i,(r)1 = F',{irIi(r),(r), i(T)]I
which, of course, represents Nash equilibria.
7. TuTHIRD PARTY SITUATION IN WHICHTHE OTHER AGENT'S
STRATEGYis NolKNOWN (CASE C).
In Case C in Table I the agents donot know the strategy of the other
agent, but they obtain some information concerningthe other agent from
third parties, such as mediators. In thiscase historical information is
supplemented by information madeavailable by a third party inter-
mediary concerning the strategiesor objective function of the other agent.
This case is important becausein the absence of such thirdparty informa- tion itis frequently difficultor impossible to communicatea complete
strategy. Rather, the agentscan only communicate through their actions,
which may lead to false signalsor undesirable outcomes. Furthermore, in
the absence of thirdparty information the agentsmay very well choose to
vary their initial strategies widelyin order to map out the otheragent's
response curve, possibly leadingto incorrect inferencesor even disastrous
outcomes. With third partyinformation the need for suchprobing is re-
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F.;
U1(r) (r) xJ<(T)L',(r)duced and, if a fixed point such as u7* and u7in (13)s found, it will he
stable. Examples of such third party interaction include mediators in
labor-management negotiations and shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East.
Revised December 1976
8. CoNciusio,'
This paper has classified multiagent situations and treated three im-
portant cases that have generally not been discussed in the literature. The
first, Case A, is one in which the agents each know the strategies or objec-
tive function of the other, leading, in a dynamic framework, to fixed point
strategies, which constitute a Nash equilibrium. The second, Case C, is
one in which the agents do not know the strategy or objective functions
of the other but can learn from the past history of the system. In this
adaptive case each agent may formulate predictions of the strategy to be
taken by the other, leading again to fixed point strategies. By contrast to
the previous case, however, the fixed point in this case generally does not
constitute a Nash equilibrium. however, if it is a self-fulfilling equilibrium
it must he a Nash equilibrium. The final case, C, is one intermediate be-
tween the previous two, in which historical information is supplemented
by information made available by a third party intermediary. Such infor-
mation is generally helpful in reaching the fixed point strategy and in
avoiding possibly disastrous outcomes engendered when the agents at-
tempt to probe the system for information.
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